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Section 6: Methodology
THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND THE INFERENCE TO
A COHERENT EXPLANATION
U. J. Kühne
By common understanding thought experiments are a tool to gain new
knowledge about nature by means of armchair philosophy only. The obvious
consequence of this position is either a straightforward platonistic interpreta-
tion of physical laws (as, e.g., J R BROWN proposed) or the need to banish
thought experimentation from the empirical sciences completely (which goes
back to DUHEM). Recent statements try to evade this alternative by identify-
ing thought experiments with less provoking scientific enterprises, like doing
computer simulations (HUMPHREYS) or argumentation (NORTON). Thereby,
however, they fail so far to do justice to the history of science, where the
thought experiment appears to be a prominent scientific method of its own
right.
Going back to the (in modern bibliography unknown) roots of the con-
cept ‘thought experiment’ in the philosophical writings of the Danish scientist
Hans Christian OERSTED (1777-1851), we find the foundation to a more
adequate understanding of thought experiments: They are in the first place
not concerned with making predictions or constructing a mental analogue of
physical measurements, but with the search for a coherent explanation of na-
ture. OERSTED’s main philosophical interest in theorising about thought
experiments was to rebuff the method of ‘speculation’, which was celebrated
by the community of the German Naturphilosophen (FICHTE, SCHELLING,
etc.), for getting it wrong with the empirical data, while he maintained deeply
romantic ideas about the harmony between human understanding and nature.
He was - in sympathy with KANT- looking for a viable middle course be-
tween the blind progress of laboratory science and the fruitless efforts of
speculative metaphysics.
A rough sketch of a modern understanding of thought experiments within
the OERSTED - tradition would read as follows: In trying to decide about a
hypothetical or unsettled experience, thought experiments make use of intui-
tions about law-like relations, which were beforehand used to explain familiar
experiences only. To do so the thought experiment has to present the unset-
tled experience in a familiar setting - thus seducing the readers to trust their
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intuitions to be applicable to this setting and to decide about it. If successful,
the readers are more convinced by their intuitive decision, than by the deri-
vation from any existing theory about the given setting. There is no mystical
reason, why this decision could not be proven false by real experiments. But
we can draw the conclusion that, if the outcome of the thought experiment
does not conflict with the empirical data, those who accept the soundness of
the thought experiment obviously can explain the derived facts in coherence
with their familiar knowledge and by use of principles and laws, which to
them have an intuitive credibility prior to the empirical data in question. Thus
thought experiments in the first place install - guided by the general goal of
coherence - those principles into the scientific domain, which - were they
already established in science - would reduce the thought experiment to an
ordinary derivation from a given theory. Rather than telling us something
about the reality outside, successful thought experiments let us extract infor-
mation about intentional constraints to the construction of physical theories, if
these theories shall qualify for explanations.
In short: while at first sight thought experiments pretend to succeed with
the derivation of nontrivial facts out of reason alone, their rôle in the prog-
ress of science is to transform common intuitions into intentional constraints
on well-formed theories  -  as can be demonstrated by the history of, e.g., the
superposition principle, the law of inertia, or the demand of LORENTZ - in-
variance and their respective thought experiments
________
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Thought Experiments and the Inference to a Coherent Explanation
Florence, 20/08/95,  5.20 p.m.
By common understanding thought experiments are a tool to gain new
knowledge about nature by means of armchair philosophy only. However,
our common understanding of the facts of nature states that these are con-
tingent, and that neither conceivability nor logic, mathematics, analyticity or
any combination of these suffice to decide about the truth of an empirical
matter of fact. The decision about a matter of fact can, by the standard doc-
trine of empiricism, only be done by looking at nature with our senses, mak-
ing observations and measurements.
Thus the so-called “paradox of thought experiments” arises, which can be
phrased by the question: Where does the information come from which great
scientists in history regularly claim to have derived by thought experiments
(and which too often turned out true to be dismissed as a chance guess)?
It has, by a committed minority of authors, been argued that thought experi-
mentation is in fact the long-looked-for instrument (or rather: sense-organ)
for the exploration of the a-priori order of nature. By way of doing thought
experiments, they claim, we could forward directly to the truth without
dwelling on the tedious business of induction from the dirty data of unreli-
able real experiments. - This interpretation of thought experiments has, how-
ever, until now not been developed in enough detail and with rigour enough
to convince a sceptic – and the lack of any demarcation criteria between
sound thought experiments in accordance to this claim and sheer nonsensical
speculation impedes me from any further elaboration.
But the opposite interpretation, that is to say: thought experiments are just a
fake, deceiving their audience by disguising their lack of substance with fancy
suggestive stories, I regard unsatisfactory, too. This is because it cannot an-
swer to the rôle thought experiments always played in the development of
scientific theories. I’ll come back to this point in a minute.
Even though it is now at large accepted that thought experimentation is a
common and legitimate method within the empirical sciences, (or I should
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rather say: that the practical scientist wouldn’t stop thought experimentation
if philosophers decide they were illegal) the problem to make sense out of
them within a plausible philosophy of science has not yet been resolved. The
usual way to evade the alternative of the just-mentioned extreme positions is
to identify thought experiments with less provocative scientific methods. For
instance, if Norton proposes that thought experiments are just arguments, the
claim that new knowledge about nature can be gained by them without leav-
ing the armchair is not surprising at all. However, it is then hard to under-
stand, why thought experiments always “invoke particulars irrelevant to the
generality of the conclusion” - Why do thought experiments always come in
the full ornament of detailed stories about counterfactual situations, if the
core-argument suffices?
Mach, to give another example, explained the predictive power of thought
experiments with reference to hidden stores of empirical knowledge. He
writes that for instance the grammar of our language has, by an evolutionary
process, been adopted to the physical reality. Thus, when thought experi-
ments look like an a-priori reasoning, they in fact restore, according to Mach,
the empirical data, which went into the formation of human modes of think-
ing. But here again we should ask: Why shouldn’t it be enough to restate the
hidden knowledge explicitly, and why bother with thought experiments? - In
general: if one identifies thought experiments with something well known, the
whole concept of “thought experiment” becomes superfluous. It is a matter
of conceptual hygiene to banish the word “thought experiment” from the
methodological terminology, if it can be replaced in all instances by more
familiar names - like “argumentation” or, in other cases, by “simulation”,
“illustration”, “idealisation” or “model based reasoning”  and so on.
Time allows at this conference only to state a problem (which I just did) and
answer it. I want to apologise for the unphilosophical shortness of my an-
swer.
The thesis I want to put forward is that thought experiments are in fact a
necessary part of scientific methodology, but not concerned with the deriva-
tion of new knowledge about nature by means of armchair philosophy, but
with the explanation of nature (which is a far more natural thing to do in an
armchair). The impression that often in the history of science thought ex-
periments were capable to predict the outcome of real measurements (which,
at the time of the thought experiment, were for technical reasons impossible)
results - according to this thesis - from the nontrivial interdependencies of
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prediction and explanation in scientific methodology, which needs a detailed
analysis. But before I add a few words to this problem, let me name some
reasons, why I think thought experiments deal with the development of ex-
planations of nature (as opposed to: predictions of nature):
One reason is (of course) that the above mentioned “paradox of thought
experiments” is otherwise unsolvable: If thought experiments are not just
arguments on the basis of old knowledge and can predict contingent matters
of fact, then it would be plain necessary that platonism is true or that we are
cheated. And it would be most probable true, I think, that we could never
decide.
An other (perhaps weak) reason is that the concept of thought experiment
was actually invented as the name of the method to reach to “real” explana-
tions of nature (as opposed to mere phenomenological laws to describe na-
ture)  This was done by the Danish chemist, physicist and philosopher Hans
Christian Oersted (living from 1777 till 1851). However Oersted’s philo-
sophical writings have been almost totally ignored in this century and for lack
of time I have to do so, too. But it should be remarked that at the time of
around 1810, when Oersted developed his scientific methodology based on
four principal scientific tools (namely: 1: getting everyday experience, 2:
making observation, 3: planing and realising experiments, and last, but not
least, to construct thought experiments) there already existed the philosophi-
cal name for an scientific method to predict nature. This was the so-called
“speculation”, and “speculation” was taken perfectly seriously by a large part
of practical scientists at this time as a method to replace real experiments at
some stage of philosophical progress. Oersted was among the first to recog-
nise that this claim would discredit the whole of philosophy of science, if it is
not reduced to a reasonable level. But Oersted was not heard at and the so-
called “Romantic Naturphilosophie” did discredit the whole of philosophy of
science for a long time, till the advance of empiricism at the beginning of this
century. But the dyed-in-the-wool empiricism cannot deal with the apparent
rationalistic element of thought experimentation in the methodology of prac-
tical scientists. Thus we are today on the other side of the bridge at pretty
much the same situation of Oersted, when he wrote about thought experi-
ments. - So much for a rush through the history of methodology in three
sentences.
As a third reason why I see the objective of thought experiments in the goal
to explain nature I want to state how I see their role in the history of science.
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If one does only look at the truly spectacular thought experiments and dis-
cards all boring ones as being just terminological inflation, one can find the
following pattern:
Thought experiments become only relevant during the Kuhnian “revolu-
tions” of science. More than this: They seem to constitute an indispensable
part in the process of discrediting an old and developing a new theory. This
holds true, even if the empirical data at hand completely justifies the change
of theory. For an illustration of this claim we could have a look at the ad-
vance of quantum theory: At first sight it looks like a counterexample, since
the formulation of the mathematical apparatus of the theory has been done
solely to “save the phenomena”. While there are plenty of thought experi-
ments during the development of the mathematics of, for instance, the theo-
ries of relativity, the history of quantum theory till around 1925 can certainly
be exhausted without the reference to a single thought experiment. But, as if
every scientist agreed that this constitutes a deficit in the quality of quantum
mechanics, the thought experiments were handed in later, e.g. Heisenberg’s
gamma-ray-microscope, Schrödinger’s cat and so on. --- To my interpretation
the indispensability of thought experiments in the development of theories
simply reflects the fact that scientific theories serve two completely separate
goals. One is to predict empirical matters of fact. For this purpose it probably
suffices to have a mathematical formula, which was derived from real ex-
perimental data by some method of induction. But the other goal of theories
is to explain the phenomena. To serve this purpose, the theory needs corro-
bation by thought experiments independent from the results of real experi-
ments.
As a second result of an analysis of the great paradigmatic thought experi-
ments in the history of science one certainly finds full agreement with Norton
that they can be reconstructed as mere arguments. However, one notes that
in all of the paradigmatic thought experiments at least one of the premises,
the reconstructed argument rests on, was at the time, the thought experiment
was introduced for the first time, not explicitly accepted by the scientific
community. They even sometimes stood in strong opposition to what was
commonly accepted in science at the time, the thought experiment was
thrown into the discussion. And one notes that these premises are no tau-
tologies. That is: it is at least conceivable that these premises were false. But
history shows that these premises in the time after the acceptance of the
thought experiment constitute the more or less unreflected conceptual basis
of the new theories. Their standing inside the new theoretical framework is of
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such a strength that the platonists like Koyre or Brown apparently are de-
ceived to regard them a-priori necessities. But it is more appropriate to use
Toulmin’s phrase “ideals of natural order” to characterise the premises, which
by the means of thought experiments are introduced into the conceptual
foundation of scientific theories.
What does this have to do with explanations? Obviously very little, if one
insists - in the tradition of Hempel - on the structural identity of prediction
and explanation. However based on van Fraassen’s pragmatic interpretation
of explanation it sounds, to my opinion, perfectly natural to argue in the fol-
lowing line: Something is an explanandum, if one feels like asking a why-
question about it. One feels like asking a why-question, if the proposition
sticks out of what is regarded as the normal course of nature. And the expla-
nation should give the reason, why - as opposed to the impression at the first
sight before asking the why-question - the matter of fact in the explanandum
actually can be understood to be in perfect harmony with what the person
asking accepts to be the uncontroversial normality. In short: Scientific expla-
nations in general deal with the coherence of knowledge. And in special they
have to prove the coherence of scientific theories with the familiar knowledge
of our everyday experience.
Now, how does a thought experiment work? A thought experiment con-
fronts us with a detailed story about some hypothetical setting. For being
worded in such familiar terms one is convinced that our familiar knowledge is
applicable to this setting. We apply the same modes of thinking to this setting
which we normally use to explain an element of our everyday world without
reference to a mathematical theory. If, for instance, I would be asked to ex-
plain, why a heavy stone falls faster than a light one (what, in fact, isn’t true),
I would argue that this would be (if it were true) in coherence to our knowl-
edge, namely that there pulls a stronger force of gravity on a heavy stone then
on a light one (as we feel, when we have to carry them) and that stronger
force makes a body faster than a weak one (as we know from the fact that a
chariot with two horses can be faster than a chariot with only one horse
pulling) - The role of thought experiments in the development of science is to
test, whether a mathematical theory at hand is coherent with our natural rea-
soning. And this is to say, I claim, to test whether a mathematical theory has
an explanatory power. For instance, Aristotle’s theory of free fall is in line
with the just sketched argument. He claims that the velocity of freely falling
bodies is proportional to their weight. But then Galileo and Benedetti noticed
an incoherence of Aristotle with an other element of our familiar expecta-
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tions: While we do expect a chariot with two horses to be faster than one
with only one horse, we do expect two chariots with one horse each not to
become any faster, if we tie both chariots together to form a single chariot
with two horses. And our familiar modes of thinking demands that this fa-
miliar knowledge applies to a situation of two freely falling stones, if we tie
them together by a bit of string to constitute a single big stone. Thus, if Ar-
istotle’s law of free fall would be correct (what it isn’t, but what could in a
possible world be the case) two stones of the same size falling in close dis-
tance with the same speed would suddenly accelerate, if they are connected
by a little bit of string. And this fact in the possible world of Aristotle would
be incoherent to our natural expectations.
But it is of course by no means granted that a theory with a higher explana-
tory power than an other is necessarily true. Neither that our intuitive expec-
tations will not lead us astray. The fact that some thought experiments have
been able to predict the outcome of a real experiment simply reflects that it is
a good and time-honoured strategy to suppose a general coherence in nature
when one searches for theories with predictive power.
* * *
